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and antitrust laws is apparently impossible because of the conflicting
interests of both economic units.
Sam P. Bur ford, Jr.
Beefing-Up The Lockout
I. STATUTORY HISTORY1
Employers were relatively free to lockout their employees during
bargaining disputes' until 193 5 when Congress enacted the National
Labor Relations Act.' Sections 7 and 8 of the act assured unions the
right to organize and engage in lawful activities' and the right to
be protected from unfair labor practices on the part of employers.'
These sections, in recognizing a new body of union rights, were
especially distasteful to employers because they made possible attacks
on traditional power tactics used in collective bargaining.!
Congress, of course, did not attempt to eliminate all hindrances to
union activities." The act did not name lockouts as being per se unfair
practices; the term "lockout" was in fact employed in the Taft-
Both the courts and the legal writers have saturated this area with excellent analyses.
See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 92-97 (1957) (Buffalo Linen).
See also the following articles: Denbo, Is the Lockout the Corollary of the Strike?, 14 LAB.
L.J. 400 (1963); Johannesen, Lockouts: Past, Present, and Future, DUKE L.J. 257, 258, 260
(1964); Koretz, Legality of the Lockout, 4 SYRACUSE L. REv. 251, 253 (1953); Sweetall
and Aiges, Lockouts, 9 LAB. L.J. 43 (1958).
2 Iron Molders Union v. Allis--Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45, 50 (7th Cir. 1908). Of course,
the lockout was only one of a number of powerful weapons employers originally had at
their disposal. The injunction and the "yellow-dog" contract, perhaps the two most fearsome
weapons, were specifically extinguished in 1932 by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
349 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151-68 (1962). The original act is com-
monly called the Wagner Act; the 1947 amendment, the Taft-Hartley Act. Hereafter, the
statute in its present form will be referred to as the act.
4 Section 7 "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. S 157 (1964).
Section 8:
(a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this title; -
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
e,"The anger of employers with the act is easy to understand. Within a period of less
than five years the anti-union employer found his legal position against unions almost com-
pletely reversed." REDER, LABOR IN A GROWING ECONOMY 221 (1957).
'See speech by Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor, in debate on the floor of the Senate on the bill that became the Wagner Act. 79
Cong. Rec. 7673 (1935).
Hartley Act in the same context as the word "strike."' The boundaries
of fair and unfair lockouts were reserved for determination by the
National Labor Relations Board, subject to review by the courts."
II. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION
The Board recognized early that if no antiunion intent could be
shown, an employer had the right to take measures to protect its
welfare." "Economic" lockouts, those necessary to the economic inter-
ests of the employer, were allowed in the face of or in anticipation of
a strike." Moreover, the Supreme Court soon allowed an employer to
protect itself during an economic strike, not only through a lockout,
but also through use of temporary or permanent replacements." On
the other hand, lockouts which clearly intended to combat unionism,
"offensive" lockouts, were condemned as unfair labor practices."
This was true even if there were some element of economic justifica-
tion present." Finally, even where a strike could damage the economic
welfare of the employer, the Board's position was that the employees
could not be locked out unless a strike was actually threatened."
One employer-employee problem of increasing importance could
not be easily resolved. This situation was the "whipsaw" strike in
which a union would strike only one member of a multi-employer
bargaining association in order to break up the unit and gain bar-
gaining advantages. Employers would counter by warning unions
that a strike against one member would be treated as a strike against
the association as a whole and that uniform action would be taken
against the employees of every member. Before 1954, the Board de-
'61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 158 (d) (4) (1964); 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
173 (c) (1964); 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 176 (1964); 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29
U.S.C. 178 (1964).
929 U.S.C. 160 (1964).
0""We recognize that an employer may lawfully discontinue or reduce operations for
any reason whatsoever . . . provided only that the employer's action is not motivated by a
purpose to interfere with and defeat its employees' union activities." Pepsi-Cola Bottlng Co.,
72 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1947). (Emphasis added.)
"Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951) (to safeguard customers when the
union refused to indicate when a walkout might be called); International Shoe Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 907 (1950) (to avoid the disruption of a department closely integrated with other
departments); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943) (to prevent spoilage). The
anticipated economic loss, however, must be more than ordinary loss of business accom-
panying a strike. Re American Brake Shoe, 116 N.L.R.B. 820, 826-27 (1956).
"NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telephone Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
"3NLRB v. National Motor Bearing Co., 105 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1939) (to impede em-
ployees from organizing); Williams Coal Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 579 (1939) (to discourage
participation in union activities).
"
4New England Web, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 1019 (1962); Savoy Laundry, Inc., 137
N.L.R.B. 306 (1962); Ripley Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 1452 (1962).
"Re American Brake Shoe Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 820, 826 (1956).
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nied employers such a counter-attack."6 The courts, on the other hand,
seemed more inclined toward allowing it,"' but the Supreme Court
withheld statement until 1957 in the well-known Buffalo Linen case.
III. BUFFALO LINEN-MUSCLE FOR THE LOCKOUT OR FOR
THE BOARD?
A linen-supply association operating in and around Buffalo, New
York, had been bargaining successfully on a multi-employer basis
with the Teamsters Union for approximately thirteen years. In 1953,
during negotiations for a new contract, the union struck and picketed
one member of the eight-member association. On the next day the
other seven employers shut down, locking out their workers. A week
later an agreement was reached, and all employees returned to work.
The union sued for violation of rights guaranteed by section 7"5 and
for unfair labor acts under section 8 (a) (1) and (3)" of the act.
The Board modified its former rule" and dismissed the complaint."'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a surprising action,"
remanded the case to the Board for a ruling that the lockout was
unlawful." Reviewing this issue for the first time, the Supreme Court
upheld the Board and reversed the Second Circuit.24
The Court expressly refused to generalize on an employer's right
to lockout employees," but it did help to justify lockouts used to
protect an employer's association from a "whipsaw" strike. Although
not purely "economic," this type of lockout was not necessarily
"offensive" or even "retaliatory." The term used by the Board had
been "defensive."2 This term met with Court approval. The Court
6 Davis Furniture Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 279 (1951); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91
N.L.R.B. 409 (1950). See also WERNE, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND MAN-
AGEMENT'S OBJECTIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 44-5 (1956).
17 NLRB v. Spalding Avery Lumber Co., 220 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1955); Leonard
v. NLRB, 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953); Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d
576 (7th Cir. 1951). The seventh circuit in Morand advanced the proposition that the lock-
out should again be considered a complete corollary to the strike. See note 33, infra.
1s29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
" 29 U.S.C. § 15 8(a) (1964).
20 See note 16 supra. A distinction has been drawn between the "pre-Eisenhower" and
"post-Eisenhower" composition of the Board. Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer
Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 70, 71, 77, 81 (1956); Sweetall
and Aiges, Lockouts, 9 LAB. L.J. 43, 46-7 (1958).
21 Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 457 (1954).
22 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
2' Truck Drivers Union, Local 449 v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956).24 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
" "Nor are we called upon to define the limits of the legitimate use of the lockout ...
We thus find it unnecessary to pass upon the question whether, as a general proposition, the
employer lockout is the corollary of the employee's statutory right to strike." Id. at 93.
28"[I]n the absence of any independent evidence of antiunion motivation, . . . the
Respondent's action in shutting their plants until termination of the strike at Frontier was de-
fensive and privileged in nature, rather than retaliatory and unlawful." Buffalo Linen, 109
N.L.R.B. at 448.
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recognized, however, that lockouts themselves were not easily cate-
gorized." The problem was rather one of an equitable balancing of
interests by an expert authority. That authority was the Board. Mr.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, described the Board's func-
tion as follows:
The ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate
interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national
labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the
Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board,
subject to limited judicial review.2"
A problem left to be solved after Buffalo Linen was whether the
Supreme Court had been approving primarily the lockout or the
authority of the Board.2 The Ninth Circuit" elaborated on the
former view in NLRB v. Great Falls Employers' Council, Inc." The
court allowed the association employers, in a situation similar to that
in Buffalo Linen, not only to lock out all employees but also to recall
them periodically for just enough time to prevent their receiving un-
employment relief. Could this second action be labelled "defensive?"
The Fifth Circuit went one step further. In NLRB v. Dalton Brick
& Tile Corp."s the court allowed a lockout by a single independent
employer primarily intended to put pressure on the union during
bargaining. Although the court would not adopt in full an earlier
statement of the Seventh Circuit that the lockout should be accepted
as a corollary of the strike,2 the court did agree that a lockout cre-
ated no presumption of illegality. 4 Most important, no attempt could
27 Distinctions often made at present are as follows:
(1) "economic"-independent of intent to interfere with unions;
(2) "offensive" ("retaliatory")-striking (back) at union,
(a) "illegal"-purpose to avoid legal bargaining process,
(b) "bargaining"-purpose to advance employer interests in bargaining process;
(3) "defensive"-concerning whipsaw strikes.
See Sweetall and Aiges, Lockouts, 9 LAB. L.J. 43, 45 (1958). Unfortunately, these labels
are more easily defined than applied. See Koretz, Legality of the Lockout, 4 SYRAcusE L. REv.
251, 266-73 (1953) and Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the
Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 70, 73 (1956). Sweetall and Aiges, supra at 45-6,
argue that the Board itself has never attempted to classify lockouts in a rigid manner.
" 353 U.S. at 96. (Emphasis added.)
2 For an excellent initial analysis see Larson, Current Labor Decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, 11 Sw. L.J. 322, 328-30 (1957).
"°Davis Furniture Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. (1951), decided before Buffalo Linen.
as 2 7 7 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1960).
3301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
"s The Seventh Circuit in Morand had stated, " . . . the lockout should be recognized
for what it actually is, i.e., the employer's means of exerting economic pressure on the union,
a corollary of the union's right to strike." 190 F.2d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1951). After citing
Morand the Fifth Circuit concluded, "To speak in absolutes is just the beginning, since it is
now clear that any such 'right' to strike, favored as it is, is conditioned. Rather it is our




be made to explain the Dalton court's decision in terms of "economic"
or even "defensive" justification. The decision was a concrete, though
qualified, acceptance of the lockout as a bargaining weapon.
On the other hand, several circuits placed increased emphasis on
the authority of the Board. In Quaker State Oil Refining Co. v.
NLRB" the Third Circuit affirmed the Board's decision that an
"offensive bargaining" lockout was illegal," quoting Mr. Justice
Brennan's statement of the Board's importance." The Tenth Circuit
used similar reasoning (citing Quaker State) in affirming a Board
order against another "offensive bargaining" lockout." The Board
itself indicated its interpretation of Buffalo Linen by denying the
legality of an association lockout after a strike of one member when
the employers admitted both "defensive" and "bargaining" intent."
In labor disputes not involving lockouts, the courts had frequently
upheld the Board's decision, even before Buffalo Linen, on the basis
of its special ability to balance interests and judge intent.' Buffalo
Linen seemed to give express Supreme Court recognition to the
Board's expertise and authority. Justice Brennan's conclusion was
cited not only in lockout cases, but also in cases involving other unfair
labor practices on the part of management. The Board was upheld in
charging unfair labor practices due to lack of significant employer
justification for otherwise legal actions. 41 Moreover, the Supreme
Court allowed the Board to brand certain employer actions with the
label of inherent unlawful discrimination, thus presuming lack of
justification.4
The Board's increased authority was brought into question, how-
ever, in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union."3 In that case the Supreme
Court refused to uphold a Board decision that the union had violated
section 8 (b)" of the act by sponsoring on-the-job harrassing activities
to put pressure on the employer. The Board had judged the activities
unlawful. Ironically, it was Justice Brennan who wrote the majority
3' 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 917 (1959).
" In Quaker State the facts were ideal for the complaint. The union had given assurance
that it would not strike and had offered to extend the bargaining agreement. The employer
had closed down his plant before the expiration of the contract.
37 Id. at 44; see note 28 supra and accompanying text.
"SUtah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir.
1961).
"
9 Anchorage Businessman's Ass'n, 124 N.L.R.B. 662 (1959).
4 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). But see NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
"' Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
4
'NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,
373 U.S. 221 (1963); Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
43 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
4449 Stat. 452 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 158 (b) (1964). See note 3 supra.
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opinion vindicating the union activities. In language somewhat sur-
prising considering Buffalo Linen, Justice Brennan explained the
Court's position:
Thus the Board in the guise of determining good or bad faith in nego-
tiations could regulate the choice of economic weapons a party might
summon to its aid, and if the Board could regulate the choice of eco-
nomic weapons that may be used as part of collective bargaining, it
would be in a position to exercise considerable influence upon the sub-
stantive terms on which the parties contract."
After acknowledging his conclusion in Buffalo Linen he added the
following:
But recognition of the appropriate sphere of the administrative power
obviously cannot exclude all judicial review of the Board's actions ...
We see no indication here that Congress has put it to the Board to de-
fine through its processes what economic sanctions might be permitted
negotiating parties in an "ideal" or "balanced" state of collective bar-
gaining.4"
This language seems to fly directly in the face of his earlier state-
ment in Buffalo Linen. One possible explanation for this apparent
conflict might be based on the structure of the act. The Board in
Buffalo Linen had exerted its authority in a relatively "gray" area.
Sections 7 and 8(a) guaranteed protection to unions, but neither
denied nor affirmed the legal power of employers to act as they had
done. The extent of employers' legal power was then undefined by
statute, and the Board's expertise was necessary. In Insurance Agents
the Board had accused the union of violating Section 8 (b) which
outlawed several union abuses but gave the employer no positive
rights, no corresponding protected activity. Moreover, the union's
actions themselves were perhaps protected by section 7 and 8 (a)
guarantees. The Board had no cause to invade this statutory territory.
Following such an analysis, it might seem that lockouts would have
been relatively unaffected by Insurance Agents."
A second possible explanation reverts back to the dual emphasis of
Buffalo Linen. Perhaps the Court approved the lockout in question
but, hesitant to back employers absolutely, skirted the issue by de-
ferring to the expertise of the Board. Following this analysis, the Court
could later take a firmer stand on lockouts by using the language of
Insurance Agents against the Board.
4 5 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
8 Id. at 499-500.
4' But see NLRB v. Great Falls Employers' Council, Inc., 277 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir.




Unfortunately, Justice Brennan did not leave any clues as to the
correct explanation. In Insurance Agents he acknowledged Buffalo
Linen but dismissed it without distinguishing it significantly. Until
1965, then, the area was marked by two opposing comments on the
Board's authority and little light as to the legality of the lockout.
IV. AMERICAN SHIP BUILDING-BROWN
Two recent cases have indicated which aspect of Buffalo Linen,
i.e., the legality of the lockout or the Board's authority, is gaining
greater Supreme Court approval. The first case48 involved a lockout
by a single employer. The employer, the American Ship Building
Company, had been bargaining with a group of eight unions since
1952 and, during each series of negotiations, the unions had called a
strike. On June 6, 1961, the company and the unions began new
negotiations which extended beyond the expiration of the existing
contract. During negotiations, the company expressed constant fear
of a strike, which would have been especially harmful if called as a
ship entered the Chicago yard. The union negotiator denied any
intent to call a strike; however, he admitted his lack of complete
control over the workers. (A wildcat strike had, in fact, broken out
in February, 1961.) On August 9, the parties separated without
having reached an agreement and, on August 11, the company shut
down its operations, locking out the employees until a contract could
be completed. Negotiations resumed and a contract was agreed upon
on October 27. The next day the company recalled all employees.
The unions filed unfair labor practices with the Board.
Reviewing the facts, the trial examiner found the lockout to be
"economic" and thus justified.' The Board, by a three-to-two major-
ity, decided that the company's main objective was "offensive," that
is, that the company had shut down to bring pressure on the unions
to break up the impasse." The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed the Board's decision. 1 The Supreme Court unani-
mously reversed.
Mr. Justice Stewart's majority opinion is of special importance in
that it practically ignores the "economic justification" argument.52
4The American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
" "The case at bar falls somewhere within the principles found in a line of cases where
an employer has been found to have taken certain 'defensive actions' during bargaining ...
Respondent was economically justified and motivated in laying off its employees when it
did .. " The American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1382, 1383 (1963) (trial examiner's
report).
" The American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963).
51 NLRB v. The American Ship Bldg. Co., 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
12 In this respect Justices White, Goldberg, and Warren, expressly concurring only as to
result, must certainly be considered dissenters.
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Instead, it strikes directly at the question of lockouts employed to
break up a bargaining impasse. s3 The Board had always presumed any
bargaining lockout to be unlawful per se under sections 7 and
8 (a) (1) and (3)." Justice Stewart admitted that a bargaining lock-
out can weaken the union's capacity to organize and effectuate a
strike, and that it can also tend to discourage union membership. He
emphasized, however, that such effects, to constitute unfair labor
practices, must be accompanied by antiunion intent. Intent, of course,
had always been a familiar standard in labor charges." But the Board
had granted itself the authority to presume inherently unlawful in-
tent in several instances." One of the most prominent of these in-
stances had been the bargaining lockout." The opinion in American
Ship Building indicates Supreme Court assurance that a lockout cre-
ated merely to improve the employer's position in collective bargain-
ing-not to avoid the bargaining process-may be free from unlaw-
ful intent. The lockout is then much closer to being the corollary of
the strike."
The companion case to American Ship Building, NLRB v. Brown,"6
likewise enhances the status of the lockout-and more distinctly
at the expense of the Board."0 Here the dispute was between
the union and an employer association of five retail grocers in Carls-
bad, New Mexico. The association included Safeway Food Stores
and four small private outlets. For years the association had bargained
successfully with the union. In 1960 new negotiations began and on
March 2, the union warned the employers that a strike had been
authorized. The association answered that a strike against one em-
ployer would be considered a strike against the association as a whole.
On March 16 the union struck one of the private outlets and the
other four employers immediately locked out their union employees,
promising to recall them when the strike ended. All five stores con-
tinued to operate using temporary replacements. 1 On April 22, an
3 "What we are here concerned with is the use of temporary layoff of employees solely
as a means to bring economic pressures to bear in support of the employer's bargaining posi-
tion, after an impasse has been reached." 380 U.S. at 308.
14 See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
"' Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telephone Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
56 See note 42 supra.
57 American Ship Bldg., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1364 (1963); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48
N.L.R.B. 1335, 1346-47 (1943).
5
' See notes 17 and 33 supra and accompanying text.
'9380 U.S. 278 (1965).
6" The latter part of American Ship Bldg.-itself placed limits on the authority of the
Board. But in Brown the Court was faced with a situation more nearly comparable to Buffalo
Linen-only with the parties reversed. The Board had ruled against the employer association.
61 The replacements consisted primarily of transferred managerial personnel and relatives
of the managers and supervisors. A few "sack boys" and "box boys" were also hired. All
replacements were told that the regular employees would be reinstated when the strike ended.
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agreement was reached and all strikers and locked-out employees
were returned to their jobs.
Reviewing the union's complaint, the trial examiner and the Board
followed Buffalo Linen in agreeing that the lockout itself was lawful.
They then held that the continued operations with temporary re-
placements constituted unfair labor practices."2 The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit denied enforcement. 3 After granting certiorari,
the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with Justice White
as the lone dissenter.
Justice Brennan delivered the majority opinion and cleared up
much of the confusion perhaps caused by his opinions in Buffalo
Linen and Insurance Agents. He followed the Buffalo Linen decision
only to the extent of justifying the lockout as being a good-faith
defensive measure," adding that since a complete shut down would be
critical to retail dealers of perishables, the use of temporary replace-
ments must necessarily be allowed."s The remainder of his opinion in
denying the Board's authority to intervene bears a close resemblance
to his opinion in Insurance Agents. The employers' actions, he argues,
may have been injurious to the union position and perhaps even dis-
criminatory in nature. Nevertheless, they were unaccompanied by
antiunion intent. Section 8 (a) (3) requires the latter element, and
the Board can assume antiunion intent only in exceptional circum-
stances." "When the resulting harm to employee rights is thus com-
paratively slight, and a substantial and legitimate business end is
served, the employer's conduct is prima facie lawful.""
American Ship Building and Brown should give employers new
cause for confidence. It is important that the Court in both cases
spoke in broad, clear terms and met several issues head-on. The "bar-
gaining" lockout was given renewed respectability. The "defensive"
e0 John Brown, 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962). This decision, like American Ship Bldg., was
by a three-to-two majority.
"aNLRB v. John Brown, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963).
64 Justice Brennan's choice of words should be noted. He quoted the following sentence
(cited in note 28 supra): " 'The ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legiti-
mate interests.' " Then, instead of continuing with the next sentence of the former opinion
(which broadly reserves the "balancing" for the Board), he stated, "We concluded that the
Board correctly balanced those interests in upholding the lockout ... " 380 U.S. at 282.
(Emphasis added.) He thus seemed to reject the thesis that in Buffalo Linen the Court recog-
nized the Board's special authority. Later, in discussing the sentence of Buffalo Linen dealing
with Board authority, he discussed only the phrase "limited judicial review." 380 U.S. at
290-92. Cf. note 28 supra and accompanying text.
" Mr. Justice Brennan did not justify these later acts as permissible "offensive" tactics.
They are still "defensive." In effect, he agreed that the active strike against one employer
was a tactical strike against the entire association.
"He was quick to point out that even in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221
(1963), the Court upheld the Board only after extensive review.
0'380 U.S. at 289.
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lockout was allowed as a form of counterattack. Employer justifica-
tion and intent was viewed in a new, favorable light and given even
greater importance, and the Board's special authority to regulate bar-
gaining was challenged. The Court finally admitted not only that
"collective bargaining is a brute contest of economic power,"' but
also that previous Board policy had been denying employers needed
muscle.
V. CAVEAT
Employers should not allow themselves to become too confident
over the increased strength of their weapon. Economically, the lock-
out by itself is an undesirable action for an employer because his
plant is inoperative. In effect, he has created the same result as a
strike, with the possible advantage of timing.
Moreover, although the Court's language is quite broad, it is doubt-
ful that the permissibility of lockouts will be expanded absolutely to
the limits stated. (A fortiori expansion is not likely beyond the limits
stated.) In both cases the facts were equitably favorable for the
employers' position. In American Ship Building the trial examiner,
two Board members, and three Supreme Court justices agreed that
the lockout was economically justifiable. Then too, a bargaining
impasse had been reached. The Supreme Court's opinion, in fact,
was expressly limited to cases fitting this situation. The Supreme
Court, if reviewing lockouts which are without any legitimate eco-
nomic justification or which occur before an impasse, 9 would prob-
ably uphold the Board. It is doubtful, then, that the lockout will
soon attain the status of a complete corollary to the strike."°
The facts in Brown were even more appropriate for the Supreme
Court's decision. The employers were, with one exception, small re-
tailers dealing with perishable items. Moreover, all elements of the
association's actions, i.e., warning, type of replacements, promise to
reinstate, and immediate reinstatement, indicate that they were good-
faith "defensive" actions purely to preserve the integrity of the bar-
gaining unit. In situations where lockouts and replacements are shown
to be clearly "offensive" or "retaliatory," the union would probably
succeed in its action."
e8NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960).
eSee, e.g., Quaker State Oil Refining Co., 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959).Again it should be emphasized that the strike is expressly granted statutory protection,
supra notes 4 and 5. No such provisions exist in favor of the lockout.
'In Food Giant Super Markets, 145 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1964), for example, the union
called a strike against a single employer. Since only 25% of the-employer's employees went
on strike the employer was able to continue normal business operations. Nevertheless, all
employers in the association locked-out and replaced their union employees. This was-and
probably still would be-held to be illegal.
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